The Arab Regatta - a half year report card.  CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2011 by Emerson, Michael.
 
 
Michael Emerson is Senior Associate Research Fellow at CEPS. This Commentary is also published 
as an editorial in the European Neighbourhood Watch, July 2011. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2011 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ 
http://www.ceps.eu 
The Arab Regatta – 
a half year report card 
Michael Emerson 
1 July 2011 
 
he Arab spring of 2011 is now an undisputed historical fact, embracing 17 Arab states 
all the way from Morocco to Yemen, and possibly more beyond. But no-one seems 
able to say where it is heading. Ideal outcomes can be dreamed of. But what could 
really happen in the months and years to come? 
One can recall the regatta metaphor, used in the 1990s to follow the progress of Central and 
Eastern Europe in their post-communist transitions into the European Union. In the Arab 
regatta now underway, every one of the Arab states has been shaken by the Arab spring. All 
are entering uncharted political waters. But where could these vessels now go, with many 
hazards ahead – a multiplicity of Scyllas and Charibdises? The box below outlines a schema 
of regime types and conceivable regime dynamics that can be drawn up on the basis of what 
has already transpired in the Arab spring, and what other world regions have experienced in 




Regime typology for monitoring the Arab regatta 
1.  Status quo maintained, e.g. with aid of subsidies to buy acquiescence, maybe leading later to 2 
or 3 
2.  Progressive constitutional reform 
3.  Uprising against the regime, leading to … 
a.  Moderate protests, no regime overthrow, possibly then move to 1 or 2 
b.  Violent repression, no regime overthrow, possibly then move to 1 or 2 
c.  Civil war, tribal or sectarian conflict: either regime survives (=3.b), or is overthrown (=3.d) 
d.  Regime change, with: 
i.  Power vacuum 
ii.  Clean break with new democratic constitution 
iii.  Renewed corrupt authoritarianism  
iv.  Military regime  
v.  Radical Islamist state  
vi.  Failed state  
vii. Protectorate regime with external presence 2 
Category 1 sees Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates managing to sustain the status 
quo, although Saudi Arabia remains much more conservative than the smaller Gulf states. 
Their main response so far to the Arab spring has been to distribute oil manna to keep the 
people content with the status quo.  
Category 2 sees Morocco, Jordan and Oman undertaking or pledging political reform in the 
direction of constitutionalisation of their monarchies, for which the European history books 
provide numerous examples, but which took decades or centuries to mature. However it is 
not at all clear how far the reforms pledged by these states will be implemented. They may 
well be watching what happens next in Tunisia and Egypt before deciding what to do.  
Saudi Arabia is pushing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to invite Morocco and Jordan 
to associate with them in some way or become members, perhaps to enhance their 
monachy’s legitimacy and identify a credible model for political reform (Category 1 
associating with Category 2). Yet it seems doubtful whether this initiative will really 
develop.  
Category 3 is about uprisings seeking regime overthrow, but here scenarios expand in 
number and explode in degrees of difference.  
Tunisia and Egypt have seen their impressively non-violent uprisings succeed in a first step 
of regime change (3.d), but leading to what? For the moment Tunisia sees a fragile power 
vacuum (d.i), alongside preparations for elections in October to a special assembly to adopt a 
new democratic constitution, with regular elections to follow thereafter (d.ii). The main 
political parties competing for power are socialists and Islamists.  
Egypt is also preparing constitutional reform, and for a presidential election in October (d.ii), 
but under the management of the military, which might develop into a military regime 
(d.iv), while the Muslim Brotherhood seems so far to be the strongest party preparing for the 
elections.  
Islamists in both Tunisia and Egypt can see the relevance of the Turkish model with its 
democratic Islamist AK party now convincingly re-elected. However the role of the military 
in Turkey as overarching political controller a few decades ago stands for an earlier vintage 
Turkish model that will also resonate in Egypt, but not Tunisia.  
Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain on the other hand have seen the Arab spring turn 
murderously bloody, with violent repression causing hundreds or thousands of deaths.  
Libya sees a still unresolved combination of violent repression (3.b), civil war (3.c) and 
external military intervention by NATO, mandated by the UN Security Council to protect 
civilians, but obviously escalated with the aim to collapse the Khadafi regime. This military 
action should end soon, which might conceivably lead to an external peace-keeping presence 
in the event of Khadafi’s demise (d.vii), Bosnia /Kosovo style. This external intervention 
under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine will become in any case a landmark case 
study in international relations norms, whether it becomes a success or failure.  
Yemen saw violent repression first (3.b), becoming then more of a civil war (3.c), leading to 
at least a partial regime overthrow with the departure of the wounded President Saleh for 
Saudi Arabia, and now an apparent power vacuum (d.i). At the time of writing all options 
seem open for the period ahead, ranging in the best case to reconciliation of the warring 
tribes and a new constitution (d.ii), through to the uncontrolled Al Qaida presence signaling 
more of a failed state (d.vi).  
Syria is now in the midst of a tragic mix of violent repression (3.b) getting close to civil war 
(3.c), with all options open as to what comes next. Sectarian conflict is highly possible. 3 
Bahrain saw an episode of violent repression (3.b) with military intervention from Saudi 
Arabia, but may now get onto a constitutional reform path (2). Sectarian conflict is also here 
highly possible.  
Algeria has seen only moderate protests (3.a), given its terrible experience of civil war in 
recent decades. Lebanon similarly has the memories of civil war as a restraint, but sectarian 
violence is constantly simmering. Also Iraq has seen so much violence in recent years that 
this may explain the relatively subdued reactions so far to the Arab spring. But both Iraq and 
Lebanon are exposed to whatever happens next in Syria.  
The Palestinian territories are sui generis, with attempts to form a new unity government 
between Fatah and Hamas ongoing at the time of writing. One impact of the Arab spring has 
been to bring demands for Palestinian statehood to the fore, with plans to seek recognition at 
the UN in the autumn. Already the regional context changes, with Egypt opening its border 
with Gaza. Syrian youths have tested the frontier with Israel on the Golan Heights, 
presumably with official encouragement to distract from internal problems.  
Scenarios for the possible emergence of a radical Islamist state (d.v), or of relapse after 
regime change back into renewed authoritarianism (d.iii) cannot be excluded, but it would 
be premature to signal such scenarios for any particular case.  
The challenge now for all interested parties is to try to understand what evolution, or zigzag 
sequence, of regime types may lie ahead. The experiences of Latin America and South East 
Asia offer many narratives for nascent democracies, with many instances of uprisings and 
regime overthrow leading to sequences of would-be democratic regimes, military regimes, 
and renewed authoritarianism. These episodes have often lasted decades before finally 
giving way to sustainable democracy, as for example in the major cases of Brazil and 
Indonesia. In other cases regime instability between civilian and military rule may persist, as 
currently in Thailand. The recent experiences of former Soviet Union states have seen the 
immediate post-communist regimes revert to absolute authoritarianism in Central Asia, 
semi-authoritarianism in Russia. Eastern Europe offers a sobering range of regimes between 
the authoritarian Belarus and Azerbaijan to the disappointing sequels to the colour 
revolutions of Ukraine and Georgia of the mid-2000s. 
For the time being, the summary scorecard for the 17 Arab states is as follows: 
•  4 seek to sustain the status quo. 
•  3 seek moderate political reform. 
•  2 have achieved regime change and seek a clean constitutional break 
•  4 have degenerated into violent repression or civil war, 2 of which have provoked 
external military intervention. 
•  3 are fragile but relatively quiet after moderate protests. 
•  1 pushes for statehood. 
This is a simplified benchmarking, which at least may serve as a basis for an update in 
another six months time, and as an aide in trying to get a sense of the political dynamics at 
work. It is another huge political transition story, approaching in importance that which 
erupted in Central and Eastern Europe two decades ago, comparable certainly in the power 
of cross-border revolutionary contagion, while of course very different for the historical and 
cultural context; yet at the same time so many of the mechanisms of corrupt authoritarianism 
are more universal than regional. To return to the regatta imagery, all vessels are on the high 
seas, yet their next ports of call seem to be mostly shrouded in fog.  